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Collective Virtue
In this paper, we aim to advance the nascent discussion of collective virtue in three ways. First, in section 1, we offer two new arguments for the existence of collective virtues. Second, in section 2, we offer a new account of the nature of collective virtues in general which has significant advantages over the leading rival account of the nature of collective virtues. Third, in section 3, we contribute to the project of classifying collective virtues by distinguishing between collective virtues which have individual virtue analogues from those that do not, and by offering examples of some of the distinctively collective virtues which have no individual analogues. We argue that distinctively collective virtues provide a profitable place of focus for future work on collective virtue, since analyses of these virtues cannot be derived in a straightforward manner from analyses of their individual virtue analogues.

1.	Arguments for the Existence of Collective Virtues

We begin with the observation that virtues are often predicated of collective entities just as they are predicated of individuals. Just as one might call an individual researcher, Bob, “thorough,” “cautious” or “intellectually humble,” one might call a research team of which Bob is a member “thorough,” “cautious” or “intellectually humble.”​[1]​ 
The issue of whether there are collective virtues (or genuinely collective virtues, or irreducibly collective virtues, as they are sometimes called) turns on the correct explanation for the truth of such ascriptions. On one side of this debate are summativist views, according to which these predications are made true only by individuals, considered independently from groups, possessing properties. A simple summativist account might propose that “Collective C has virtue V if, and only if, all or most of the individuals that are members of C, considered independently from their membership in C, have virtue V.” On the other side are anti-summativist accounts. They propose that for at least some ascriptions of virtues to a collective entity, the truth of these ascriptions is accounted for only by reference to group-dependent properties—properties that cannot be possessed without the existence of groups. It has been assumed in the literature on collective virtue that if anti-summativist views about collective virtue predications are correct, then there are collective virtues.​[2]​ 
We do not dispute the foregoing assumption that the truth of anti-summativism about collective virtue predications would secure the existence of collective virtues. In fact, we will employ this assumption below in our defenses of the existence of collective virtue. We do note, however, that there is more than one way that anti-summativism about virtue ascriptions can be true. First, it can be true if the correct explanation for a virtue ascription to a collective requires positing individual members of a group that possess group-dependent properties. Second, it can be true if the correct explanation for a virtue ascription to a collective requires positing a collective entity itself possessing a group-dependent property.
Thus far in the literature on collective virtue the strategy for defending the existence of collective virtue has been to argue that anti-summativism about collective virtue predications is true in the first way just described—because the correct explanation of the truth of some predications of virtues to collectives requires the individual members of a collective to possess group-dependent properties.​[3]​  In attempting to establish anti-summativism about collective virtue in this way, authors have appealed to the more substantial literature on collective responsibility, and to arguments within that literature which dispute summativist accounts of collective belief and collective action predications. Results in the literature on collective responsibility have been taken for granted, and these results have been employed by those working on collective virtue to defend the existence of collective virtues. We review a prime example of such argumentation in the next subsection.

1.1	Extant Arguments Defending Collective Virtues

A prime exponent of the aforementioned strategy is Miranda Fricker.​[4]​ She appeals to Margaret Gilbert’s​[5]​ arguments against summativist accounts of collective belief predications in order to defend anti-summativism about collective virtue predications. Briefly, Gilbert argues that there are cases in which it is correct to predicate a belief B of a collective C, but where none of the members of C, considered apart from C, have B, as well as cases where the members of a collective C, considered apart from their membership in C, all have a belief B, but where it is not correct to predicate belief B of C. This occurs, specifically, where the members of C take on different doxastic attitudes qua members of C than they do qua private individuals apart from their membership in C. As Fricker puts it, the “practical identities”​[6]​ of these persons as group members require a doxastic commitment from them that conflicts with their doxastic commitments as private individuals. For example, the members of a local dramatics society may be committed to believing that the society should be given a particular meeting space, despite the fact that, qua private individuals, they each find it inconvenient that the society is given this space. As Fricker concludes, “The summativist cannot respond [to such examples] by saying that the group feature is to be understood as the sum of the individual features, for the individual features in question . . . are not found at the level of individuals considered independently from the group, for the individuals only have that feature if they are wearing their group-member hat. Some practical identities of individuals are thus intrinsically group-involving, and in such cases there is no lower level of group-independent features to which the higher-level features can be reduced.”​[7]​
Fricker proposes that an argument paralleling Gilbert’s argument for anti-summativism about collective belief ascriptions can be offered to defend anti-summativism about collective virtue ascriptions. All that will be needed are cases where either (i) it is correct to predicate a virtue V of a collective C, but where none of the members of C, considered apart from C, have V, or where (ii) all of the members of a collective C, considered apart from their membership in C, have a virtue V, but where it is not appropriate to predicate virtue V of C. Fricker proposes that there are indeed such cases. As an example of type (i), she offers the following: 
If we imagine again an appointments committee, constituted within an institution that has explicit, comprehensive, and effective procedures in place to promote equal opportunities, then we might say that the commitment to promoting equality of opportunity automatically comes with the job of serving on the committee. In such a scenario we can imagine that the entire committee—in the right spirit, if a little skeptical regarding laborious top-down directives—merely ‘goes along with’ the good motive/skill.​[8]​
The committee members merely “go along with” the good motive/skill, because they, as private individuals considered apart from their membership in the committee, have no commitment to promoting equal opportunity. Yet, qua committee members, they of course do have such a commitment. And, because they do, Fricker concludes that “it would be churlish to withhold the title of virtue from the committee.”​[9]​ 
Others​[10]​ in the nascent literature on collective virtue have attempted arguments very similar to Fricker’s, though with less success. Our interest in the remainder of this section is to offer two additional and quite distinct arguments for the existence of collective virtues. In both cases, we follow the practice of Fricker and others of drawing liberally on the better-developed literature on collective responsibility and specifically works devoted to collective belief and collective action.

1.2	Collective Virtue Ascriptions and Collective Belief and Action Ascriptions

Our first novel argument in defense of collective virtues begins with the observation that virtue ascriptions often entail ascriptions of dispositions to believe and act. For example, if it is correct to ascribe “cautiousness” to Bob as an individual researcher, it plausibly follows that Bob tends to believe the logically weaker of two theses which equally well explain the same data, and it plausibly follows that Bob will refrain from employing in his practical reasoning theses that are not well-supported. If it is correct to ascribe the virtue of cautiousness to Bob, then it is correct to make these ascriptions of dispositions to believe and act about Bob. This is simply because part of what it is for some X to have the virtue of cautiousness if for X to have these belief and action tendencies.  
We propose that what goes for ascriptions of individual virtues likewise goes for ascriptions of collective virtues. If we correctly ascribe the virtue of cautiousness to a research team of which Bob is a member, it will likewise be correct to say that this research team tends to believe the logically weaker of two theses which equally well explain the same data and that this research team tends to refrain from employing in its practical reasoning theses that are not well-supported. This is part of what it is for the team to possess cautiousness.
Yet, if we are correct that ascriptions of collective virtues at least sometimes entail ascriptions of collective dispositions to believe and act, then we are well on our way to offering a second argument for the existence of collective virtues which draws upon the literature on collective responsibility. For, as already discussed in the previous section, there are arguments such as Gilbert’s​[11]​ in the literature on collective responsibility which defend anti-summativist accounts of collective belief and collective action ascriptions. The conclusions of these arguments are that collective belief ascriptions and collective action ascriptions cannot be made sense of apart from group-dependent properties. For example, in Gilbert’s case, the conclusion is that collective belief cannot be made sense of apart from individuals possessing beliefs qua group members. Taking this result for granted, we can see a second reason for affirming anti-summativism about collective virtue ascriptions. For, if ascriptions of collective beliefs and actions cannot be made sense of apart from group-dependent properties, then neither can ascriptions of collective dispositions to believe and act. Just as the former require group members to believe and act qua group members, the latter will require group members to be disposed to believe and act qua group members. But now, given our claim above that ascriptions of collective virtue often entail ascriptions of collective dispositions to believe and act, it will follow that ascriptions of collective virtue cannot be made sense of apart from group-dependent properties—the dispositions of group members to believe and act qua group members. Thus, at least some ascriptions of collective virtues require anti-summativism. 




Our second unique defense of collective virtues appeals to the use of multiple realizability to defend anti-summativist positions in the literature on collective responsibility.​[12]​ One way in which anti-summativist positions concerning collective belief ascriptions have been defended has involved appealing to the multiple realizability of collective beliefs. To say that collective beliefs are multiply realizable is to say that in order for a collective C to have a belief B the same individuals possessing the same properties is not required. Different individuals possessing different properties can equally well realize collective C’s having belief B, in other words.​[13]​ A very simple example that illustrates this fact is a case where a collective body has a member replaced, but retains its collective properties. A church committee, for example, has one of its members replaced, yet it retains the same beliefs regarding the direction that the church should take. Here it is plausible that the same collective entity C possesses the same belief B despite the fact that the members of C and their individual properties have changed. C’s having B is multiply realizable.
The multiple realizability of collective belief can be employed to defend anti-summativism about collective belief. For, plausibly, a collective’s having a belief B can perform unique explanatory work. For example, it may be that the church’s taking particular initiatives is well-explained by the church committee’s having the belief it does about the direction that the church should take. The church’s taking the initiatives it does is not as well-explained by the realizers of the committee’s collective belief, however. The reason for this is that good explanations should, ceteris paribus, pass counterfactual tests for explanatoriness.​[14]​ If E explains P, then, were E not to have obtained, P would not have either. The committee’s having the belief it does about the direction the church should go passes this test better than the realizers for this committee’s belief. For, if the realizers for the committee’s belief had not been the way they are, it is plausible that the committee would still have had the belief that it did—it just would have had different realizers for this belief. Yet, if the committee had not had the belief, then it is plausible the church would not have taken the initiatives it did. Accordingly, the committee’s having belief B performs unique explanatory work. And, since it does, we should not attempt to explain the committee’s having belief B solely in terms of its realizers—the members of this committee having the properties they do. The committee’s belief B is something we must commit ourselves to because of its explanatory role; yet, it cannot be accounted for as the summativist would like. The committee’s belief B is something more than its members possessing properties individually.
By now the reader has probably anticipated our proposed application to collective virtue ascriptions. Just as collective beliefs are multiply realizable, so are collective virtues. Bob’s research team, even it loses a member or has a member replaced, may remain “cautious.” Moreover, the cautiousness of the team performs unique explanatory work—explaining, for example, why the team did not claim to have discovered something more than its evidence warranted. The realizers for the team’s cautiousness do not explain this behavior of the team as well as the team’s own cautiousness, given counterfactual tests for explanatory relevance. Were the realizers of the team’s cautiousness not to have been the way they were, the team still would not have made overreaching claims. Yet, were the team not cautious, it may very well have made such claims. Accordingly, the team’s cautiousness cannot be accounted for solely in terms of its members possessing properties individually. Anti-summativism about collective virtue ascriptions is wrong.
Notably, this second novel argument for the existence of collective virtues appears to defend anti-summativism about collective virtue ascriptions in the second of the two ways sketched above—by arguing that true collective virtue ascriptions cannot be accounted for without positing a collective possessing a group-dependent property. For, if this argument succeeds, then true collective virtue ascriptions cannot be accounted for in terms of individuals possessing properties of any kind—whether those properties are group-dependent or not. Instead, true virtue ascriptions to a collective require positing a collective itself possessing a virtue. True enough, the collective’s possessing this property has individuals possessing properties as its realizers. But, one of the lessons of multiple realizability arguments in general is that what is multiply realized cannot be fully accounted for in terms of its realizers.​[15]​ We have, then, a second novel route to defending anti-summativism about collective virtue ascriptions which takes as its point of departure certain results in the literature on collective responsibility.

2.	The Basic Nature of Collective Virtues

If any of the arguments of the previous section succeeds, then there are collective virtues. Given the existence of collective virtues, a very natural next question to ask concerns the nature of collective virtues: what are they? Here we must distinguish two different questions. One is a question concerning the basic nature of collective virtues in general. It is concerned with whether an account can be offered which illuminates the basic kind of thing that collective virtues are. It is the question: what sort of thing is a collective virtue? Or, what does it take, in general, for a collective to possess any collective virtue V whatsoever? A second question is concerned with the nature of specific collective virtues. Here we ask: What does it take for a collective to possess cautiousness, courage, humility, etc.? Our discussion in this section will be focused on the former question rather than the latter.

2.1 Fricker’s Account of Collective Virtue

The leading contemporary account of the basic nature of collective virtue is again due to Miranda Fricker.​[16]​ Fricker models her account of the nature of collective virtue on Gilbert’s account of the nature of collective belief. For Gilbert, what it is for a collective to have a belief B is for the members of this collective to have jointly committed under conditions of common knowledge to this belief B. In fact, it is precisely such joint commitments that give rise to the kinds of collectives which can be the “plural subjects” of beliefs or actions, on Gilbert’s view. Fricker writes, “I propose that Gilbert’s notion of a plural subject provides a template for group virtue—‘plural virtue’ as we might call it.”​[17]​ Fricker wishes to remain neutral between skill-based conceptions of virtues and motive-based conceptions, and so she offers an account of both collective skill-based virtues and collective motive-based virtues, each in terms of joint commitments. 
Fricker’s account of collective motive-based virtue reads as follows: 
If, under conditions of common knowledge, a number of individuals commit to a virtuous moral or epistemic motive, they thereby constitute themselves as the plural subject of that collective motive. Joint commitment to a motive should be understood here as shorthand for a joint commitment to achieving the good end of the motive because it is good. . . . in jointly committing to it, they each come to possess it qua member of the group. . . . let us now add to this group motive the requisite reliability condition; and voila, we have a collective virtue.​[18]​
We can state Fricker’s account of Motive-based Collective Virtue more economically as follows:
(FMCV) A collective C has a motive-based virtue V just when the members of C, qua members of C, commit to achieving the end of V because it is good, and they reliably achieve this end.
Fricker illustrates FMCV as follows: 
Consider our diligent and thorough research team. Its members all jointly commit to the motives of diligence and thoroughness; and the team lives up to those motives by proving reliable, over an appropriate span of time and contexts, in achieving their ends. This research team displays irreducibly collective forms of diligence and thoroughness.​[19]​
Following Annas,​[20]​ Fricker distinguishes between two different ways the research team might prove reliable in achieving its ends. They might be reliable in achieving the proximate ends of their virtuous motives (which Annas, following the Stoics, calls their skopos), or they might be reliable in achieving the distal ends of these motives (which Annas calls their telos). When reliable in one of these ways, Fricker proposes that it is correct to predicate diligence or thoroughness of the research team, according to FMCV.
Fricker’s account of Skill-based Collective Virtue is parallel. It says:   
(FSCV) A collective C has a skill-based virtue V just when the members of C, qua members of C, commit to achieving the end of V, and they achieve this end reliably. 
The only difference between FMCV and FSCV is that in the case of skill-based virtue, the members of C needn’t be committed to achieving the end of a virtue V because it is good, as they must in the case of motive-based virtue. As an illustration of skill-based virtue, Fricker proposes the following: 
If the night-watch team aims to display the virtue of vigilance, its members will jointly commit to the more reliable division of labour. Need we attribute any virtuous motives to these soldiers? I don’t think so. Perhaps they just do it—that is how they were trained, and it never occurs to any of them to proceed in any other way that what is in fact the more reliable, indeed collectively skilful way. Here we come to a natural use for the excellence of skill-based model of virtue.​[21]​
The soldiers needn’t divide labor because they think doing so is good; they just do it, and by doing it they exemplify their skill of vigilance.
There is clearly a common core to Fricker’s accounts of skill-based and motive-based virtue. On Fricker’s view, a collective C’s having a virtue V, whether V is a skill-based virtue or a motive-based virtue, consists in the members of C engaging in a joint commitment to achieving the end of V and reliably achieving it over an appropriate span of time. In the case of motive-based virtues, the members of C commit to achieving the end of V because it is good. 

2.2	An Alternative, Aristotelian Account of Collective Virtue

We wish to propose an alternative account of the basic nature of collective virtue. Moreover, we will argue that our rival account has several features Fricker’s account does not have that may make it more attractive to contemporary virtue ethicists.
A basic assumption of our account is that virtues, no matter by what kind of entity they are possessed, are by their very nature dispositions. They are dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. Virtuous dispositions are arguably multi-track, disposing their possessor to display a variety of different behaviors under a variety of different conditions.​[22]​  And the behaviors themselves will be of various kinds, including overt actions, beliefs, actions done with a particular intention (such as being doing for their own sake), and so on. Indeed, the term “behavior” here should be given a liberal reading. Which specific kinds of behavior, in this liberal sense, and in which specific circumstances these behaviors are manifested, will of course depend upon which virtue we are examining. For example, the characteristic behaviors of the generous person will include acts of giving, and the specific circumstances in which these acts are performed will include circumstances wherein one possesses something that is needed or desired by another. We derive this idea about the basic nature of virtues, of course, from Book II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
Much more could be said about what exactly distinguishes those dispositions that are virtues from those that are not. Here there are various accounts available, though some may cohere better with the existence of collective virtue than others. For example, Ziv​[23]​ has argued that accounts according to which virtuous dispositions are dispositions to fulfill duties do not cohere well with the existence of collective virtues, since collectives by their very nature tend to fulfill the duties for which they were created.​[24]​ For reasons we will not enumerate in the main text, we find this argument problematic.​[25]​ But, even if it succeeded in ruling out a duty-fulfillment based conception of virtue for those who espouse the existence of collective virtues, other views about what distinguishes virtuous dispositions from non-virtuous dispositions would remain. For example, there are views according to which virtuous dispositions are those that make their possessors good members of their kind,​[26]​ and views according to which virtuous dispositions are those that equip their possessors to handle well what is difficult for members of their kind.​[27]​ For our purposes here, we will not assume any particular view about what distinguishes dispositions that are virtues from those that are not, aiming thereby to leave on the table several options for collective virtue ethicists to explore; we only assume for our purposes that the basic kind of thing a virtue is, is a disposition.
Given this dispositional conception of the basic nature of virtues, a collective’s possessing a virtue will consist in that collective being disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions. As a first approximation, then, we offer the following account of the basic nature of collective virtue:
(DCV) A collective C has a virtue V to the extent that C is disposed to behave in ways characteristic of V under appropriate circumstances.
As an illustration, a research team possesses the virtue of cautiousness to the extent that it is disposed to exhibit behaviors characteristic of cautiousness—such as believing the logically weaker of two theses—under appropriate circumstances—such as when these theses are equal in explanatory power.   
We say that DCV is only a “first approximation” because it may very well be that a collective C’s being disposed to behave in ways characteristic of a virtue V must ultimately be explained in terms of the members of C being disposed, qua members of C, to behave in certain ways. The idea that collective virtues must ultimately be explained in terms of the group-dependent properties of individuals has been assumed by those working thus far on collective virtue, and it is clear from Fricker’s FMCV and FSCV that she wishes to offer such an account. One significant motivation that has been cited for thinking that collective virtue must bottom out in the group-dependent properties of individuals is that it seems those who would deny this assumption would have to posit some kind of “spooky” group mind.​[28]​​[29]​ If the assumption is indeed correct, then while DCV may be true, there may also be a more thoroughly illuminating account of the nature of collective virtue that appeals to group-dependent properties of the members of C, rather than to C itself. We offer such a proposal momentarily. However, before doing so, we note that such an approach may not in fact be called for if the third of the three arguments for collective virtue advanced in section 1 succeeds. For, that argument proposed that, pace the assumption of others thus far working on collective virtue, collective properties cannot be accounted for in terms of the properties of individual members of the collective, whether the latter properties are group-dependent or not.
Suppose, however, that the assumption cited in the previous paragraph is correct and thus a collective’s dispositions to behave in certain ways must be explicable in terms of group-dependent properties of the members of the collective. Assuming this is correct, we offer the following more illuminating account of the basic nature of collective virtue:
(DCV*) A collective C has a virtue V to the extent that the members of C are disposed, qua members of C, to behave in ways characteristic of V under appropriate circumstances.
DCV*, like FMCV and FSCV, explains collective virtues in terms of group-dependent properties of members of the collective. However, it still explains collective virtues quite differently than do FMCV and FSCV. And, as we now argue, it has features which may make it more attractive than FMCV or FSCV for some contemporary virtue ethicists. We cite three such features.
First, unlike FMCV and FSCV, DCV* straightforwardly identifies virtues with dispositions. According to DCV*, a collective has a virtue V when its members are disposed to behave in ways characteristic of those possessing V. By contrast, FMCV and FSCV account for a collective’s virtue V in terms of the commitments of the members of this collective. These members must be committed to achieving the ends of V. However, being committed to act in a certain way and being disposed to act in a certain way are not the same thing. One can commit to behaving a certain way but not be disposed to behave in that way. Certainly when a person does this, he deserves to be criticized. And, certainly the ideal case is one where the person who commits to behaving in a certain way is disposed to behave in that way. But, this ideal is not always the reality. For instance, we can make good sense of Bob chastising one of his fellow research team members, saying “You committed to behaving cautiously, but you seem to have no interest in doing so!” 
This difference between DCV* on the one hand and FMCV and FSCV on the other may lead some virtue ethicists to find DCV* more attractive than FMCV or FSCV. For, as already mentioned, by identifying virtues with dispositions, DCV* fits squarely within the Aristotelian tradition. Yet, this tradition is the dominant tradition by which contemporary virtue ethicists are influenced.​[30]​ Thus, such theorists may very well find DCV* more attractive than FMCV or FSCV, at least in this respect.
Fricker may respond that, while committing to a behavior is not the same as being disposed to exhibit that behavior, there is another element of her account of collective virtue that we have overlooked—the reliability condition. FMCV and FSCV each propose that for a collective C to have a virtue V, the members of C must reliably over a period of time act so as to achieve the end of V. Fricker might propose that the members of C being reliable in this way entails that they are disposed to behave in such a way as to achieve the ends of V. 
We offer two answers to this response. First, the literature on dispositions makes it clear that something x’s reliably exhibiting a behavior b over a course of time does not entail that x is disposed to exhibit behavior b. This is made clear by cases where dispositions are masked.​[31]​  A simple example would be where a magician places a spell on a fragile glass each time it falls, preventing it from shattering. The glass reliably withstands these falls; but the glass is nonetheless disposed to break when it falls—this is part of what its fragility consists in. Similarly, the members of a collective could reliably exhibit behavior that advances the end of a virtue V despite not themselves being disposed to exhibit such behavior, if their own dispositions are masked. 
In fact, we go even further with respect to the reliability conditions of FMCV and FSCV. We propose that the fact that DCV* does not include a reliability condition, while FMCV and FSCV do, will speak in favor of DCV* in the eyes of some contemporary virtue ethicists. This is because there are significant reasons for thinking that possessing a virtue V which disposes its possessors to exhibit characteristic behavior b does not require that one reliably over a period of time exhibit b. We cite three such reasons.
The first reason for opposing such reliability conditions derives from the kinds of new evil demon cases that motivate internalist views of virtues.​[32]​ Compare Bob who displays perfect caution in his research in the actual world with Bob* who exhibits exactly the same kinds of behaviors as Bob in another possible world, w. Bob*, like Bob, believes the logically weaker thesis each time he has to choose between competing theses with equal explanatory power, and he makes sure never to draw overreaching conclusions. Unfortunately, Bob* is the victim of an evil demon, who systematically manipulates Bob*’s evidence in a successful effort to deceive him. Bob*, plausibly, does not reliably achieve the aims of cautiousness—namely, avoiding error. Nonetheless, there is strong intuitive pull to say that Bob* has performed his research tasks in a way that is equally as virtuous as the way in which Bob has. After all, Bob and Bob* have exhibited the very same behavior! Thus, we have one reason for thinking that possessing a virtue does not require that one reliably achieves the aim of that virtue.  
Perhaps Fricker would respond to this first argument against reliability conditions by proposing that it does not afflict proximate reliability conditions, but only distal reliability conditions. It is the distal aim of cautiousness to avoid error, but it is the proximate aim of cautiousness to behave in exactly the ways Bob* behaves. Thus, contrary to the argument above, Bob* does reliably achieve the aims of cautiousness—the proximate aims, that is. 
We think there is something to this response, and so will not press this first argument against reliability conditions further. We grant that it may only rule out distal reliability conditions. To address proximate reliability conditions, we offer two further arguments.
The first such argument appeals again to the phenomenon of disposition masking. The kind of masking that occurs in the case of the magician and the glass shows that something can have a disposition to exhibit a behavior b without ever exhibiting this behavior—much less reliably exhibiting it over a course of time. Thus, those who think of virtues as dispositions should not be attracted to reliability conditions on virtues, either of the proximate or the distal kind. And, as we said above, many contemporary writers in virtue ethics will think of virtues in this way.
This second reason for rejecting reliability conditions will only be convincing for those who are attracted to dispositional conceptions of virtues that do not already contain independent reliability conditions, of course. If one was attracted to a dispositional conception of virtues that added a reliability requirement, these arguments would not suffice to convince one to jettison to reliability requirement. Our final argument for rejecting reliability conditions will accomplish this, however.
The final reason we offer against including reliability conditions in an account of the general nature of virtues is that doing so prevents one from being able to offer explanations of this reliability in terms of virtues. Plausibly, where a research team is reliable in achieving the aims of cautiousness over a period of time, this is often because the research team is cautious. For example, part of the explanation for why Bob’s research team reliably avoids errors may very well be that it is a cautious research team. But, if we define the research team’s being cautious partially in terms of its reliably achieving the aims of cautiousness, then the aforementioned explanation will become circular. We will be saying that the team is reliable in achieving the aims of cautiousness because it is reliable in achieving the aims of cautiousness. The explanation is not circular, however, but informative. In order to maintain explanations of this kind, we must remove reliability conditions from accounts of the nature of virtues, as DCV* does.
Three arguments, then, support DCV* over FMCV and FSCV, on account of it’s not including a reliability condition. One appeals to new evil demon cases, one to the phenomenon of disposition masking, and one to the fact that virtue possession often non-circularly explains the relevant kind of reliability when it is present.
The third and final feature of DCV* that we think will make it more attractive than FMCV or FSCV for many contemporary virtue ethicists is that DCV* straightforwardly delivers a graded account of the possession of collective virtues. Whether a collective possesses a virtue, according to DCV*, is a matter of degree. This is because DCV* proposes that a collective C has a virtue V to the extent that its members are disposed to behave in certain ways. Some collectives may therefore possess a virtue, V, to a greater degree than others.​[33]​ By contrast, FMCV and FSCV appear to make a collective’s possession of a virtue an all-or-nothing affair. This is because they propose that a collective C has a virtue V when its members are committed to the end of V. But, it seems that the members of a collective simply are committed or are not committed to the end of V. Commitments, in other words, don’t come in degrees. 
That DCV* makes a collective’s possession of a virtue a matter of degree will make it agreeable to many contemporary virtue ethicists. Indeed, in her overview article on virtue ethics, Hursthouse​[34]​ writes very plainly, “Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree.” Thus, if DCV* clearly delivers a graded account of collective virtue possession while FMCV and FSCV do not, it will in this way be more attractive than the latter.
Fricker may respond that while commitments do not come in degrees, reliability does. Thus, she may propose that a collective C has a virtue V to the extent that its members, who are committed to V, reliably achieve the aims of V over a period of time. Since some collectives will have members who are more reliable than the members of other collectives in achieving the aims they are committed to over a period of time, some collectives will possess virtues to a greater degree than others. 
We think this move helps Fricker’s account in the face of the present objection, but not enough. For we think that the degree to which an entity possesses a virtue at a time t depends simply on the internal constitution of that entity at t, rather than on how that entity behaves at other times.  How cautious Bob is at t is a matter of what Bob is like at t, not a matter of how Bob behaves at other times. Of course, this is not to say that Bob’s being cautious at t will not have probable implications about Bob’s conduct at other times. Because Bob is cautious at t, it is likely that he will not draw conclusions prematurely at time t1, which is later than t. Indeed, probabilistic implications of this sort partially account for why we typically think of virtuous traits as enduring features of character.​[35]​ Nonetheless, if Bob refrains from prematurely drawing a conclusion at t1, this is not part of what makes Bob cautious at t. Rather, the extent to which Bob is cautious at t is determined simply by how Bob is at t. Thus, while the present move helps Fricker’s view to secure a graded account of collective virtue possession, it mislocates the origin of the gradation. It mistakenly makes the degree to which a collective possesses a virtue V at a time t a matter of how the members of the collective behave at times other than t. 




Thus far we have offered novel contributions to the defense of the existence of collective virtues and to accounting for the basic nature of collective virtues. In this final section, we turn our attention to the project of categorizing collective virtues. In particular, we consider the question of whether each collective virtue V has an individual analogue. We think that many collective virtues do have individual analogues. Moreover, we show below that in cases where collective virtues do have individual analogues, there is a very simple way to generate detailed accounts of these specific collective virtues that are based on the detailed accounts of their individual analogues. Nonetheless, we argue that not all collective virtues have individual analogues. Some collective virtues are instead distinctively collective virtues. We propose that some of the most interesting work for future collective virtue ethicists concerns these latter kinds of collective virtues, in part because we cannot generate accounts of these virtues in the same way that we can generate accounts of collective virtues that are not distinctively collective. 
As already affirmed, we think that collective virtues very often do have individual analogues. Many examples of these kinds of collective virtues have already been mentioned in this paper. The collective virtues of cautiousness, intellectual humility, diligence and thoroughness, for instance, all have individual analogues. What this means is simply that individuals can privately possess cautiousness, intellectual humility, diligence and thoroughness just as well as collectives can. 
Because individuals can privately possess cautiousness, intellectual humility, diligence and thoroughness just as well as collectives can, we can employ our understanding of these individual virtues to generate accounts of their collective counterparts. For example, suppose that the individual analogue of intellectual humility is an individual’s disposition to display “striking or unusual unconcern to be well regarded by others.”​[36]​ To generate an account of the collective virtue of intellectual humility, all we need to do is replace the references to individuals in this account with references to a collective. Accordingly, a collective C has the virtue of intellectual humility when it is disposed to display striking or unusual unconcern to be well-regarded by others. According to this account, collective intellectual humility is clearly a virtue with a basic nature satisfying DCV.
Of course, the foregoing account of collective intellectual humility fits the mold of DCV, rather than DCV*. In other words, it appeals to the dispositions of a collective, rather than the dispositions of the members of this collective. And, for familiar reasons offered in section 2 above, one may prefer an account of collective intellectual humility fitting the mold of DCV* instead—one that appeals to the dispositions of the members of the collective. Thankfully, the needed change is quite straightforward. We simply replace the account of collective intellectual humility above with the following: a collective C has the virtue of intellectual humility when its members, qua members of C, are disposed to display striking or unusual concern to be well-regarded by others.
The foregoing illustration shows that there is a simple way to derive an account of a collective virtue that is not a distinctively collective virtue if we already have an account of the individual analogue of this virtue. Since virtue ethicists have focused nearly all of their attention on individual virtues rather than on collective virtues,​[37]​​[38]​ this will be very helpful for those who wish to better understand the nature of specific collective virtues. However, we propose that the job of accounting for the nature of specific collective virtues cannot be completed in its entirety in this way. This is because there are distinctively collective virtues.
The best examples of distinctively collective virtues of which we are aware are examples where the collective virtue in question has to do with the way the members of the collective interact with one another, rather than the way in which they engage the world outside of the collective entity of which they are members. We mention two such examples.
The first example is the collective virtue of self-regulation. By this we mean to refer to a virtue that concerns the way in which a collective entity polices the behavior of its members by enforcing group-specific standards of conduct. Several authors in the literature on collective responsibility have discussed this kind of collective feature, though they do not employ the language of virtue to describe it. For example, French​[39]​ proposes that a collective entity can only be responsible for an event if it exhibits this sort of self-regulation. 
We propose that collective self-regulation is a good example of a distinctively collective virtue. This is because the collective virtue of self-regulation consists in some kind of disposition the collective has to treat its members in certain ways. There can be no individual analogue of collective self-regulation simply because individual persons do not have members to regulate.​[40]​ To be sure, there may be individual virtues that resemble collective self-regulation in certain respects. One thinks, for example, of personal self-discipline. Still, an account of collective self-regulation cannot be derived from an account of individual self-discipline in the simple way in which an account of collective intellectual humility can be derived from an account of individual intellectual humility. Collective self-regulation is therefore a distinctively collective virtue.
A second example is the collective virtue of solidarity. By this we mean to refer to a virtue that concerns the way in which the members of a group empathize with and unite themselves to each other. A collective possesses solidarity to the extent that its members are disposed to treat one another in these ways. As with collective self-regulation, some writers working on collective responsibility​[41]​ have proposed that collective solidarity is a precondition for a group bearing responsibility. Others​[42]​ do not go this far, but do stress that certain especially valuable kinds of groups are necessarily solidary. No previous authors that we are aware of, however, use the language of collective virtue to describe collective solidarity.
For the same reason that there cannot be an individual analogue of collective self-regulation, there cannot be an individual analogue of collective solidarity. For, an individual has no members that can empathize with and unite themselves to each other. Of course, there are individual virtues that resemble collective solidarity—virtues of care, for example, that promote the very kinds of individual activities that realize group solidarity. Nonetheless, an account of collective solidarity cannot be derived from an account of individual solidarity in the simple way in which an account of collective intellectual humility can be derived from an account of individual intellectual humility, since there simply is no such thing as individual solidarity. Collective solidarity is a distinctively collective virtue. 
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